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The aim of my paper is to: analyze the phenomenon of Radio Maryja (Radio Virgin Mary), present 
arguments for classifying the movement around it as the Polish Religious Right, compare it to the 
American Religious Right, and examine the processes which led to the creation of both movements. 
The comparison of activities, agendas, rhetoric, structures, and methods used by the Polish and 
American Religious Right’s leaders indicates that, despite denominational and historical differences, 
both movements share many characteristics. Therefore, it is interesting to place the analysis of the 
processes that led to their creation in a broader sociological perspective. 
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Introduction 
The American Religious Right movement has been important in American politics at least since the beginning 
of the 1980s. Surprisingly enough, in the early 1990s a somehow similar movement was created in Poland. The 
Polish Religious Right has not been strictly defined or researched, but it seems quite apparent that Radio 
Maryja (Radio Virgin Mary) along with  a structure of organizations around it can be classified as a religious 
(or rather Catholic) right. The phenomenon of Radio Maryja itself has been discussed in Poland quite 
extensively, especially in relation to the controversial rhetoric used by its charismatic leader, Father Tadeusz 
Rydzyk. Polish politicians, journalists, and academics usually pay more attention to it during the election 
periods when its political involvement becomes most intense. The questions that are raised then usually 
concern the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the separation of Church and state. However, 
there has been little attention paid to the fact that the movement around Radio Maryja can actually be analyzed 
as a religious right movement, as it resembles religious right movements elsewhere in the world. Therefore, in 
the first part of this paper I will present the history and controversies around Radio Maryja, as well as the 
arguments which might suggest that it can be classified as the Polish Religious Right. In the second part I will 
briefly present the American Religious Right, and then in the third section of the text I will compare the Polish 
and American Religious Right movements, as it seems that despite denominational and historical differences, 
they share a lot of similar characteristics, especially in terms of their agendas, rhetoric, structures, and 
methods. Finally, in the fourth part of the article I will present selected theories of secularization, privatization, 
and deprivatization of religion which might be helpful in understanding the reasons for the emergence of both 
movements.1  
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1
 This article is partly based on my previous paper concerning Radio Maryja “Defending Religious and National 
Identities. A Comparative Study between Polish and American Religious Right Movements” published in Religions 
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1. Radio Maryja 
Due to the turbulent history of Poland, the Roman Catholic Church has almost always been involved in 
politics. During the partition2 of Poland it acted as a chief guardian and repository of Polish national values and 
opposed the oppressors. During the time of communism, it was involved in the struggle for democratic 
changes. Thanks to the fact that it was never allied with the communist regime, it was possible for it to assume 
a privileged position in the new democracy. Nevertheless, it soon turned out that Polish society was not 
entirely satisfied with the role that the Church wanted to play in politics. Not only citizens, but also the Church 
itself became divided over the question of the degree to which it was desirable for the Church to continue to be 
involved in politics after Poland’s new democracy was created. One of the very conservative groups of Polish 
Catholics who supported the Church’s strong political involvement, advocated constructing Polish law 
according to Catholic values, and postulated the need to protect the religious and national identity of Poland 
against the “influence of the secularized European Union” soon gathered around Father Rydzyk and his Radio 
Maryja. They created a number of institutions which, as it soon turned out, aimed especially at the political 
mobilization of conservative Catholics.  
The history of Radio Maryja began in the early 1990s when Father Rydzyk, a Redemptorist, initiated 
informal talks concerning opening a radio station. First, he spoke to his Provincial Superior (Cydzik 2001: 14), 
and to an Italian diplomat, Ivano Petrobelli. In February 1991, he convinced Petrobelli to financially contribute 
to the creation of a religious radio station in Poland – a station that would “serve the purpose of 
evangelization.” In March 1991, Father Leszek Gajda, the Provincial Supervisor in Poland, supported Father 
Rydzyk’s efforts (Lebioda 1995: 7). The idea of establishing Radio Maryja in Poland might be partly attributed 
to the fact that previously Father Rydzyk spent some time in Germany where he was involved with a radio 
station, Radio Maria International in Balderschwang (later closed by the Catholic Church on charges of 
propagating intolerance). It is interesting to note that Rydzyk’s tenure in Germany was opposed by his 
superiors, but he remained abroad for five years. During this time not only did he become interested in the 
influence of the religious media, but also in such ideas as the political and economic “third way,” nationalism, 
and belief in the global government of speculators. Radio Maria International certainly served as a model for 
his Polish Radio Maryja. However, Father Rydzyk was also fascinated by American preachers who hosted 
their own television programs and established their own broadcasting networks.  
Soon after receiving approval from his Provincial Supervisor, Father Rydzyk started to collect money for 
his radio from individual donors and from organizations of Poles abroad (from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, the 
USA). The concession for the radio was given to the Redemptorists in 1991, and the first broadcast took place 
in December of that year. In the beginning, the idea of a Catholic radio also gained the support of the Polish 
Episcopate, as its main aim was supposed to be evangelization. The Episcopate agreed for Radio Maryja to 
broadcast on 117 local radio stations. In 1993, thanks to the satellite EUTELSAT II – F2, Radio Maryja 
broadcasts were available everywhere in Europe. In 1994, Radio Maryja was granted permission to work as a 
national social broadcaster (Lebioda 1995: 8). Father Rydzyk, considered a Founder of the Radio, became its 
Director, and Father Jan Król was nominated as the Vice-director. The station, officially owned by the Warsaw 
Province of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, was to be financed through donations from its 
audience - unlike most radio stations in Poland which are either publicly funded or dependent on advertising 
revenue. Being Church-operated, according to the concordat, the radio is not bound by regular accounting 
rules, which means it is not required to pay taxes and to disclose the exact source of its financing.   
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and Identities in Transition, I. Borowik, M. Zawiła (eds.). The topic, however, has been extended here, sociological 
theories have been added, and the data has been updated.   
2
 The partitions of Poland took place in the second half of the 18th century and ended the existence of the Polish–
Lithuanian Commonwealth. The partitions were carried out by the Russian Empire, Kingdom of Prussia, and 
Habsburg Austria dividing up the Commonwealth lands among themselves. 
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According to Radio Maryja’s authorities, evangelization was to be the main aim of the station. And 
indeed, many programs have served this purpose, including frequent recitals of the Rosary, the Breviary, 
novenas, the Angelus, the Lauds, the Chaplet of the Divine Mercy, the unction to the Black Madonna of 
Czstochowa, lectures and discussions on the Catechism of the Catholic Church, a daily transmission of the 
Mass, coverage of papal trips, and Christian music. Additionally, it soon started to offer broadcasts for 
children, nuns’ culinary advice, or community help-exchange offers. However, the most controversial fact 
about the radio turned out to be the provision of multiple political programs, including national news 
broadcasts based on political information from the “selected press,” Rozmowy niedokoczone (Unfinished 
Talks), as well as various political commentaries. The topics of focus initially included: the new Constitution, 
especially in the context of organizing church-state relations in the new democracy, the anti-abortion bill, the 
presence of religious symbols in public sphere, and teaching religion at public schools. With time, it also 
included such topics as: joining the EU, foreign investment, privatization, liberalism, homosexuality, gender, 
feminism, in-vitro fertilization, sexual education, and even the energy security of Poland. The most 
controversial aspect of these programs has been a strongly biased way of presenting the news. First of all, a 
very specific terminology has been used in all Radio Maryja political programs, e.g. “infanticide” instead of 
“abortion” or “refusal to kill a baby” instead of “refusal to perform an abortion.”3 Second of all, the most 
politically oriented program (and most widely criticized program), the infamous Rozmowy niedokoczone, as 
experts suggest, has been saturated with a xenophobic, nationalistic, and intolerant message. According to 
Krzysztof Dziomdziora, during political programs Radio Maryja presenters have concentrated only on a few 
political issues and invited guests (“experts”) who would represent only one ideological option. The phone 
calls of the listeners have been monitored and there has been a deliberate delay in their transmission. All of 
these techniques, which aim at shaping listeners’ perception of reality, as Dziomdziora claims, can be 
classified as means of propaganda (Dziomdziora 2008). 
With time Radio Maryja started to offer more and more programs. Some of them concentrated on social 
issues, others included psychological comments or advice. However, most of these programs have also 
conveyed a highly political and ideological message. The commentators hosted on these programs would 
usually represent only socially conservative or ultraconservative organizations and political parties. Also, a 
very specific rhetoric can be heard in programs concerning psychological issues. For example, those who 
advocate the acceptance or tolerance towards homosexuality, transsexualism, feminism, or gender studies have 
been presented as those who purposely try to destroy a “Polish family” and the Polish nation in general.4 Even 
during prayers political message can be heard: people pray, for example, for “God’s help to fight liberals and 
their destructive influence on Poland,” or for those who “want to destroy Polish families.”  
Therefore, although prayers and religious education have always occupied a lot of broadcasting time, 
Rydzyk’s radio station very quickly stopped being considered as a medium whose main aim would be 
evangelization. Radio Maryja soon started to be seen not only as the main advocate of constructing Polish law 
according to Catholic values, but also as the most xenophobic, nationalistic, and intolerant medium in Poland.  
As it soon turned out, the radio was not the only means through which Father Rydzyk wanted to convey 
his message. Between 1992 and 2010 he created a network of organizations and media concentrated around 
Radio Maryja, including newspapers, a TV station, and a number of local clubs of Radio Maryja listeners. 
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3
 All these expressions were still being used during the transmissions in July 2014, mostly in connection to the case 
of Professor Bogdan Chazan, the director of the Holy Family Hospital in Warsaw who refused to perform an 
abortion on a seriously deformed fetus despite the fact that the deformation of the fetus is one of the very few 
circumstances in which Polish law allows for abortion. Two other situations when abortion is permitted are when the 
woman’s life or health is endangered or when the pregnancy is a result of a criminal act. Instead of performing an 
abortion or directing the patient to another doctor within the permitted time (conscience clause), Chazan offered 
medical advice and hospital care for the mother, and perinatal hospice care for the child. 
4
 What is interesting is that while homosexuality is defined as “sickness that should be treated,” a regular 
psychotherapy for alcoholics has been rarely mentioned. In some of the programs, it has been advised simply to pray 
to the Virgin Mary if there is an alcoholic problem in the family.   
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Being especially appreciative of the role of modern media, Father Rydzyk put a lot of effort into establishing a 
TV station. Telewizja Trwam (TV I Persist) started broadcasting in 2003. It offers a variety of programs 
concerning political and social affairs as well transmissions of religious events and prayers. One of its most 
important broadcasts is Rozmowy Niedokoczone also available on Radio Maryja. The TV officially belongs to 
the Lux Veritatis Foundation, which is a religious organization founded by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk and Father 
Jan Król in 1998.5 Just like Radio Maryja, the TV station is owned by the Warsaw Province of the 
Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. It is financed through donations, and according to the concordat it 
is not bound by normal accounting rules.  
Among the magazines connected with Radio Maryja, there are: W Naszej Rodzinie (In Our Family), a 
magazine which was established in 2010 but had previously been published as Rodzina Radia Maryja (The 
Family of Radio Maryja), and the most important one, Nasz Dziennik (Our Daily), a newspaper which has 
been published since 1998. The motto of Nasz Dziennik is “Veritatis splendor” (“The Splendor of Truth”). 
According to the newspaper’s website, Nasz Dziennik is an important source of information about Poland, the 
Church, and the world; it presents “current information and articles concerning politics, culture, economy, 
faith, religion, history, and the future,” which usually “cause vivid reactions and discussions.”6 Some of the 
most known authors and contributors to the newspaper are: Dr Stanisław Krajski, Prof. Jerzy Robert Nowak, 
and Prof. Andrzej Nowak, all known for their controversial rhetoric as well as for their ultraconservative 
views. 
Apart from the media, a certain structure of organizations has been created in order to integrate the 
audience of Father Rydzyk’s media. For example, Rodzina Radia Maryja (The Family of Radio Maryja) and 
Koła Przyjaciół Radia Maryja (Circles of Friends of Radio Maryja) are local structures of listeners. Their aim 
is “to help people find God and to promote patriotism and national values”; their motto is: “God-Honor-
Fatherland.”7 Their members gather for discussions and prayers. There are also organizations that gather young 
people, such as Młodzie owe Koła Przyjaciół Radia Maryja (Radio Maryja Youth Groups) and Podwórkowe 
Kółka Ró a!cowe (Rosary Clubs for Children). Radio Maryja Youth Groups are defined by Radio Maryja as 
“spontaneously created groups of young listeners who are connected by their love of God, the Holy Mother, 
and the Fatherland as well as by their willingness to act for the New Evangelization through the cooperation 
with Radio Maryja.” As “witnesses of Christ” they organize prayers and discussion clubs, and are supposed to 
be active in social media, promoting Catholic literature.8 The first Rosary Club for Children was established in 
1997 by Magdalena “Madzia” Buczek, a 9-year-old, handicapped girl. The motto of the Rosary Clubs 
movement is: “No day without a prayer, no week without a Holy Eucharist, no month without a confession.” 
The aim of the clubs is to remind people about the Marian apparition in Fatima and “Mary’s request to pray 
with a Rosary.”9 Their prayers which are transmitted on Radio Maryja, however, often include a strictly 
defined and frequently a political intention. In order to integrate these groups of Rydzyk’s followers, there are 
pilgrimages to the image of the Black Madonna in Czstochowa organized for them each year. All of these 
groups (whose members regularly connect religious language with a national rhetoric) also serve purposes of 
grass root activism.  
Additionally, Father Rydzyk has paid attention to the necessity of educating future young leaders of his 
movement. Not only has he encouraged his listeners to become active on the internet, which had been 
presented earlier as having a destructive influence on young people, but also established a private secondary 
school and high school10 through the initiative of another foundation, Nasza Przyszło"# (Our Future). The 
 
5
 More about the Foundation at: http://www.luxveritatis.pl/ 
6
 More about it at: http://www.naszdziennik.pl/o-nas-pl 
7
 Olsztyn Circle program at: http://www.saletyni.olsztyn.pl/wspolnoty/kolo/kolo.html
8
 More about it at: http://www.radiomaryja.pl/mlodzi/mlodziezowe-kola-przyjaciol-radia-maryja/ 
9
 More about it at: http://www.pkrd.vel.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101&Itemid=92 
10
 In Polish education system: ‘gimnazjum’ and ‘lieceum.’ 
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schools were opened in Szczecinek in 1998.11  Apart from the two schools, Father Rydzyk also decided to 
establish a private college. Wy sza Szkoła Kultury Społecznej i Medialnej (The College of Social and Media 
Culture) was opened in Toru! in 2001. Just like Telewizja Trwam, it belongs to the Lux Veritatis Foundation. 
Father Rydzyk served there in the function of provost until 2006. He had to resign due to the introduction of a 
new law that required the provost of any higher education unit to be at least a Ph.D. Students of this college 
can choose from programs such as: journalism and social communication, culture studies, political science, 
computer studies, international relations, and diplomacy. Most of the programs are at the B.A. level, some are 
at the M.A. level, and some are just additional postgraduate non-degree courses (e.g. a course on how to apply 
for the EU funds). According to the college’s website, “the school allows its students for a holistic personal 
development. Thanks to skillful connection of the Catholic faith (fides), strengthening the mind (ratio), it gives 
meaning to searching and finding truth (including the Absolute Truth), and aiming at goodness (also the 
Ultimate Goodness)” (author’s translation).12   
After presenting the whole consortium of Radio Maryja it becomes obvious that Father Rydzyk and his 
followers have quite a lot of resources that can be used in order to promote their vision of contemporary 
Poland. Most importantly, they have young leaders educated in the spirit of Radio Maryja, whose vision of 
Poland and Polishness is very specific. 
It is important to remember that Radio Maryja was founded during the period of political transformation 
when the Roman Catholic Church in Poland was forced to search for its place in a democratic and pluralistic 
society. When it turned out that there was quite strong social opposition against giving the Church a dominant 
role in the new reality and against its direct political involvement, Father Rydzyk easily identified people 
responsible for this kind of attitude. According to him, they were all post-communists and “strangers” who did 
not want the Church in public because they were trying to gain political and financial dominance in Poland 
after 1989 for themselves, and at the expense of real Poles (Catholics) “whom the Church was trying to 
protect.” He gained the support of the poorest and least educated people who suffered most from the 
transformation, and soon convinced them that the same people who had made their lives miserable during 
communism were the ones responsible for propagating liberal views concerning such issues as morality, 
abortion, and homosexuality. When liberal media in Poland pointed out that people who have listened to Radio 
Maryja were not well-educated, and therefore prone to manipulation and eager to accept rhetoric that offers a 
simplified version of the world, the supporters of Father Rydzyk’s media quickly responded. Dariusz Zalewski 
accused the intelligentsia of contempt and even disgust for the poor. He wrote: 
“But now we need to ask the question of the spiritual and intellectual roots of this intelligentsia? Let us 
remind that Polish elites were extinguished by the fascist and communist executioners. In their place, there 
was a pseudo-elite created, the one of Marxist or socio-liberal roots with an aversion to Catholicism. We 
have a paradox here. People with lower education who had to take part in the process of mind-
contamination created by the communist education system were under its influence for a much shorter 
period of time, therefore they are much less prone to propaganda and that is why they accept the views of 
Radio Maryja” (Zalewski 41) (author’s translation).  
This opinion might explain why Father Rydzyk wanted to create his own college. He also expressed his 
aversion to the intelligentsia, including the Catholic intellectual circles around Tygodnik Powszechny13 or 
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 Nasza Przyszło"# Foundation, created in 1995, was also responsible for the publishing of Rodzina Radia Maryja, 
and still publishes W Naszej Rodzinie and Kalendarz Rodziny Radia Maryja. 
12
 It is worth mentioning that students of journalism also take part in the traineeship program at Radio Maryja. More 
at: http://www.wsksim.edu.pl/index.php?pg=static&id=4
13Tygodnik Powszechny is a Polish Roman Catholic weekly magazine, which focuses on social and cultural issues. It 
was established in 1945 by Cardinal Adam Stefan Sapieha. Among its editors, there were: Jerzy Turowicz and 
Adam Boniecki. It has tried to reconcile the values of liberalism with the principles of faith and has presented an 
open ecumenical view of Polish Catholicism. Its goal was a dialog, therefore people with non-Catholic views have 
been often invited to take part in printed debates.
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Wi !.14 He said he had noticed that those circles were created by the people who “were actually afraid of the 
Church.” This intelligentsia, according to him, wanted to correct not only the Church but also Christ Himself. 
In Rydzyk’s view, they became influenced by the West and its intellectual currents. As a consequence, he 
stressed, they neglected the cult of the Virgin Mary, the duty of confession, and other dogma elements. For 
him, it is unacceptable. He said, “Either you are totally and wholly with Christ or you are against Him” 
(Rydzyk qtd. in Cydzik 2001: 18). However, he considered most of the Church in Poland still uncontaminated 
by Western ideas and therefore truly Catholic. In one interview, he claimed that he had prayed to God that He 
would not let the Church in Poland go the way of the West. The West and especially Western secularism were 
identified by Rydzyk as anti-Polish and anti-Catholic forces.  
It is very important to stress that Catholicism according to Father Rydzyk and his followers is practically 
identical with Polishness. Father Rydzyk’s media have been very active in convincing people not only that 
being Polish means being a Catholic but also that the well-being of the Catholic Church is identical with the 
well-being of Poland (Gend wiłł and Stasik 2008: 37). Father Rydzyk has also frequently suggested that 
listening to Radio Maryja is the only true declaration of faith and of national belonging (33). I think that the 
best way to present the Radio Maryja circle’s views concerning the relationship between being Catholic and 
being Polish is a fragment from the conversation between Stanisław Krajski and Father Rydzyk: 
“Stanisław Krajski: If a Pole is an atheist, his atheism must be a result of some personal tragedy. He must 
have lost his faith because no Pole is born to be an atheist. If he loves Poland, he should also love the 
Virgin Mary, or at least protect Her from assaults because she is the Queen of Poland. What should we 
require from an atheist who claims to be Polish? 
Father Rydzyk: This is a problem of belief. Perhaps this man has not yet found Her (Virgin Mary). (…) The 
fact that the Virgin Mary is the Queen of Poland is a great grace, a great chance for Poland and for the 
world. I meet different theology specialists (…). They say that Poland will save the world because Poles 
love the Virgin Mary like no other nation. The Virgin Mary is the way to save both the Church and the 
world. I think she is our Queen and we are her knights (…) 
Stanisław Krajski: Father, you mentioned that only under the symbol of the cross Poland can be Poland and 
a Pole can be a Pole and that Poland is the kingdom of the Virgin Mary. How should we understand that? 
Father Rydzyk: The Lord planned this: from the very beginning through entire Polish history, our symbol is 
Christ’s cross, next to it there is the Virgin Mary. This relation is in our blood. Christian culture, the Word 
of God, cross – these are symbols that have the meaning thanks to which we live. They create our mentality 
(…). Only with the cross we can be ourselves” (Krajski 2002: 62) (author’s translation). 
For Krajski, who is one of the best-known contributors to Nasz Dziennik, the arguments of Father Rydzyk 
were not new. In his book published in 1998 he wrote about “different faces of the Church” and clearly stated 
that the only true Church is the one represented by the followers of Radio Maryja. He enlisted several “faces of 
Catholicism,” including: “frigid Church,” “Catholic Charismatic Renewal Church,” “Catho-leftist Church,” 
“Catholicism of the New Era,” “European Church,” and “traditional Church” – the last one being presented as 
the church of the true Catholics and of the true Poles. The first kind of Catholicism listed by Krajski is, 
according to him, very shallow; it is a “Sunday Catholicism” whose followers strictly divide religious and 
temporal spheres of life. The second type is, in Krajski’s view, too Protestant, too emotional, too much 
concentrated on a personal interpretation of the Bible, and neglecting the tradition of the Church. “Catho-left,” 
according to him, is more of a “socially connected group of people who are often bound by political goals.” 
Earlier members of this group were members of KIK (Club of Catholic Intellectuals15), which as Krajski 
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 Wi ! is a Catholic magazine which has been published since 1958 (closed between December 1981 and March 
1982). It was established by lay Catholic activists whose aim was to intellectually revitalize Polish Catholicism 
according to Vatican II. Its editors were members of the democratic opposition and later Solidarity. 

15
 Polish organization grouping Catholic intellectuals. KIK was founded after Gomułka's Thaw in 1956, evolving 
into a mild Catholic-center opposition group in communist Poland. 
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claims, was “contaminated by communism.” He thinks that they tried to accommodate communism to 
Catholicism, and nowadays they are still connected to the political left as well as to Tygodnik Powszechny and 
Gazeta Wyborcza,16 which, therefore, cannot be trusted. According to Krajski, for the members of this group 
Catholicism is just a private matter. On the other hand, he criticizes their efforts to make the Church involved 
in charity and social justice matters, and presents them as a lobby within the Church that wants to liberalize 
and secularize the Church.  “Catholicism of the New Era,” according to Krajski, is coming from Europe. It is 
“European and intellectual”; “it is moderate, tolerant, understanding, open, worldly, insecure, and searching for 
the dialog with pagans.” “In fact, it is bored and doubting.” “It wants to erase words like truth, goodness, and 
love and put ‘tolerance’ instead” while “there should be no tolerance for moderation and evil in all its shapes.” 
As Krajski claims, this kind of Catholicism takes too much from philosophy and other religions, and, for 
example, instead of promoting “true religious music” it promotes guitars and drums used by people from 
Taize. The “European Church,” on the other hand, is according to Krajski, torn between “Catholicism of the 
New Era” and the “traditional Catholicism.” It is “too politically-correct and wrongly tries to be more for the 
people than for Christ.” This Church, as Krajski stresses, “is trying to destroy Radio Maryja because the Radio 
is not afraid of standing for the Truth even if the Truth is controversial.” Therefore, Radio Maryja and the 
“traditional Church” are the “only hope for the true Church.” The “traditional Church” is the “Church of 
Christ, the King of the world, and of the Virgin Mary, the Queen of Poland. This Church stands for Truth and 
Goodness, regardless of what pagans think.” This is the Church that “loves and fights.” “It loves God, people, 
truth, and goodness but it fights against Satan, evil, sin, falsehood, and lies. It is the truly Polish Church, 
saturated with Polishness.” “It is the Church that has always been with Poland and for Poland, which teaches to 
be faithful both to Christ and to Poland with all its Christian tradition. This is the Church for which Polish 
martyrs have died. This is the Church represented by Radio Maryja” (Krajski 1998: 97-110) (author’s 
translations). 
This Polish-Catholic identity and heritage protected by Radio Maryja, as both Rydzyk and Krajski claim, 
has been endangered by the liberal influences from the West. Thus, during the time when Polish access to the 
European Union was being discussed and negotiated, it was obvious to them that they should fight against 
joining the European structures.  Therefore, the debate about becoming a part of the EU was one of the major 
issues discussed on Radio Maryja and in Nasz Dziennik at that time. When Father Rydzyk talked about the EU, 
he compared its “internationalism” to the “internationalism” propagated by the USSR. He criticized everybody 
who favored the idea of joining the EU, especially priests “who forgot their roots.” He blamed the atmosphere 
of “communist internationalism” in which they grew up for destroying their way of thinking (54). He also 
underlined at many occasions that Polish people should remember that in Brussels Europe integrates “in the 
liberal and Mason spirit, not in the Christian spirit.” And according to him, “liberal ideology is worse than 
communism, Nazism and totalitarian system, while every liberal is a fool.”17 Professor Ireneusz Krzemi ski 
stresses that it is important to remember that apart from the fact that the religiosity of Radio Maryja listeners is 
integrally connected with their national feelings,  their national identity is defined in the historical context – in 
opposition to Jews and Germans (Krzemi ski 2009: 127). Therefore, the EU with a strong presence of the 
Germans was unacceptable.  
Poland joined the EU in 2004 despite the Radio Maryja campaign. Father Rydzyk had to accept this fact. 
Nevertheless, the liberal influences from the West, and especially from the EU, are still being strongly 
criticized in all the media associated with the Redemptorists. The EU laws have been most harshly criticized in 
the context of the debate on the legality of abortion (including the Alicja Tysi!c case18). Other EU laws 
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 Gazeta Wyborcza is a newspaper which covers political, international and general news from a liberal perspective. 
It began publication on 8 May 1989. The paper was to serve as the voice of Solidarity during the run-up to semi-free 
elections to be held June 4, 1989 (hence its title). As such, it was the first legal newspaper published outside the 
communist government’s control. The paper’s editor-in-chief, since its founding, has been Adam Michnik.
17
 Extracts from speeches by Father Rydzyk at: http://rm.radiomaryja.pl.eu.org/wypow.htm 
18
 The woman who was awarded 25 000 euro damages by the European Court of Human Rights in 2007 because she 
had been refused an abortion in Poland despite the fact that her health (eyesight) was endangered.
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criticized on Radio Maryja are not only those concerning moral issues such as gay rights (including gay 
marriage), euthanasia, or in-vitro fertilization, but also those that regulate foreign investment in Poland or 
certain agricultural standards. This criticism, however, did not stop Father Rydzyk from applying for, 
accepting, and using EU funds for some of his own initiatives. 
Apart from the liberal West and the Germans, the group seen by Radio Maryja listeners as enemies who 
threaten Polish-Catholic identity are the Jews. Anti-Semitism has been the most vigorously criticized aspect of 
Rydzyk’s media rhetoric. It has been condemned by the mainstream media, academia, and by numerous Polish 
intellectuals. In response to this criticism, Father Rydzyk has officially declared that the presenters are not 
responsible for the views expressed by the listeners. According to Krzeminski’s study, in 2007 the presenters 
did not encourage such opinions anymore. However even in July 2014 it did not seem that they were eager to 
stop their listeners from expressing anti-Semitic comments either. The most common opinion presented in 
Father Rydzyk’s media is that the Jews “keep the most important mainstream media in Poland in their hands,” 
therefore they should be called “Polish-language-media” not “Polish media.” According to Radio Maryja, this 
is the reason why the general message of the media in Poland is atheistic and liberal. The conclusion that 
usually follows such statements is that Radio Maryja is the only truly Polish medium in Poland. Listeners of 
Radio Maryja also often accuse “greedy Jews and Masons” of stealing “Polish money.” According to them, 
Jews cannot be trusted because they betrayed Poland several times in history: during the short period of 
independence after the First World War when they “were Bolshevik spies,” then during the Second World War 
when they were “on the side of Russians” who invaded Poland, and finally during the early stages of 
communism when “most of them” joined the Communist Party. Sometimes listeners of Radio Maryja go as far 
as justifying or negating the Holocaust. On the other hand, they complain that Jews were not grateful enough 
to the Polish families who hid them during the time of the Holocaust (Maszkowski 2006). 
Among other groups considered enemies of the “true Catholic Poles” there are: Masons, communists, 
atheists, homosexuals, feminists, and “abortionists.” According to Father Rydzyk’s media, these are the people 
who denied the real Christian/Catholic heritage of their country and, therefore, started to threaten the true 
Polish national and religious identity. Additionally, as Radio Maryja followers claim, homosexuals, feminists, 
and “abortionists” are responsible for the moral degradation of society and therefore should be ostracized. 
Father Rydzyk suggested, for example, that “abortionists” should have their heads shaved just like those who 
collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War.  
There is, of course, one more external enemy – Russia. The country responsible for imposing communism 
in Poland has always been considered a threat but a specific kind of hysteria took place in Father Rydzyk’s 
media after the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash. It crushed on April 10th, 2010 near the city of Smolensk, 
Russia, killing all 96 people on board. These included president Lech Kaczy ski and his wife Maria, former 
president Ryszard Kaczorowski, the chief of the Polish General Staff and other senior Polish military officers, 
Polish government officials, 18 members of the Polish parliament, senior members of the clergy, and relatives 
of victims of the Katy  massacre. The media coined the crash as “Katy  catastrophe” and conspiracy theories 
quickly developed. The “Katy  catastrophe” and “Russian plot” have been discussed on Radio Maryja and 
described in Nasz Dziennik ever since.19 Most Radio Maryja commentators have suggested that it was an 
assassination conducted by the Russians on Polish elites, although Krajski was more eager to blame the 
Masons.20 Apart from this topic, Russia has also been present in the discussions concerning the energy security 
of Poland. Radio Maryja has been very active in advocating making Poland independent of Russian gas 
supplies. 
It becomes clear that Father Rydzyk’s media have been presenting many groups as enemies of Poland and 
its heritage. Polish scholars have noticed the presence of the so-called “besieged fortress syndrome” in the 
rhetoric of Radio Maryja. Adam Gend!wiłł and Agata Stasik see Radio Maryja and its listeners as a social 
movement mobilized by both the mission and the threat of an enemy (Gend!wiłł and Stasik 2008: 29-46). 
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 More at: http://www.radiomaryja.pl/tag/katastrofa-smolenska/ 
20
 More at: http://www.se.pl/wydarzenia/kraj/ekspert-radia-maryja-o-katastrofie-smolenskiej-wina-
masonow_275917.html
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According to these authors, what unites the listeners of Radio Maryja is not only listening to the same radio 
station. They also share a common worldview and organize common actions. Therefore, it is justified to talk 
about a specific social group or social movement that has been created by both the presenters and the listeners 
engaged in these actions. The listeners share the worldview, but the Radio allows them to create 
representations of reality through the process of communication, providing a specific filter. The Radio also 
mobilizes to take actions according to the scheme: information-formation-organization-action (31). The 
process of mobilization requires a common mission. In case of the Radio Maryja movement, the mission is to 
proselytize a very specific kind of Catholicism – the one represented only by Radio Maryja. However, 
mobilization is usually more effective if there are “besieged fortress” motifs. The construction of a common 
enemy image creates a tension necessary in order to take action. Feeling threatened by evil works much more 
effectively than only a call to proselytize. Therefore, the images of enemies presented by Father Rydzyk’s 
media are vivid.  
Ewa Bobrowska, who analyzed the discourse of the texts published in Nasz Dziennik, also came to the 
conclusion that they were filled with images of an enemy. More importantly, this enemy was mythical and 
concealed. According to her, the image of a concealed enemy was chosen because this kind of an enemy can 
be presented as even more dangerous – because it might be hidden everywhere (Bobrowska 2008: 47). Also 
characteristic for the Nasz Dziennik discourse was to create a worldview based on the conviction that social 
order is fully dependent on the moral order, and that imposing one system of values in the society would solve 
all the problems. This would certainly require rejecting pluralism. It is obvious that reality is much more 
complicated than Radio Maryja suggests. However, if a listener does not know the categories that would help 
explain the complications of the world, he/she becomes more likely to accept the mythical enemy. According 
to Bobrowska, it is very dangerous because such a strategy makes listeners even more helpless (55).  
Having considered so many aspects of Radio Maryja’s activity, it is interesting to present attempts made 
by various scholars to classify it.  Most of those who are academically interested in Radio Maryja would agree 
with Gend wiłł and Stasik that it has created a social movement. Stanisław Burdziej also tries to classify it as a 
part of civil society where certain social capital is being used. However, according to him, it is only partly true 
(Burdziej 2008: 20-29). There are certain problems with such a classification because the leaders of Radio 
Maryja have been involved in politics directly, helping to create government coalitions, and promoting certain 
politicians over others (24). Olga Wysocka additionally sees Radio Maryja as a populist movement. She 
stresses that populism as such needs the division “we” (the people) and “they” (the elites). Every populist 
manipulates the fears of the people (Wysocka 2008: 64). Therefore, the author points out that it would be a 
simplification to say that Radio Maryja is being used by the populist politicians. It has been very political from 
the beginning, and it has been very populist from the beginning. Therefore, it has chosen to ally with populist 
parties itself (68).  
Another way of classifying Radio Maryja is to consider it as a fundamentalist movement. According to 
some scholars, such classification would be reasonable, due to the movement’s negative attitude towards “the 
reconciliation with the modern world” as well as to the separation of Church and state – both ideas accepted by 
the Second Vatican Council. However, a possibility of such classification strongly depends on the definition of 
fundamentalism that we decide to accept. Most of the definitions include several characteristics of 
fundamentalism. However, some scholars would emphasize certain aspects, while some would emphasize 
others. The elements present in most of the definitions include:  a militant reaction against modernism (e.g. 
Motak 2002), a tendency to claim the unerring nature of a sacred text (Pace & Stefani 2002, Bruce 2000), and 
political involvement (Tibi 1997). For Steve Bruce, the crucial characteristic of fundamentalists is their claim 
that they want to bring back the old tradition when in fact they simply reshape it. He also underlines that 
fundamentalists usually search for support within marginalized groups and that in spite of their hate for 
modernity they do not refuse to use modern technology (Bruce 2000). The leaders and followers of Radio 
Maryja certainly represent some of these characteristics and, therefore, some scholars would call them 
fundamentalists.21 However, the movement around Rydzyk’s media does not fulfill all of the conditions 
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 E.g., D. Motak. See: Motak 2002, p. 141; and Motak 2002 (2). 
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necessary for other scholars to classify it as a fundamentalist movement. Therefore, many researchers would 
not mention it when talking about fundamentalist movements within Roman Catholic Church, defining as such 
only the Society of St. Pius X and sometimes Opus Dei. One of the reasons for not classifying Rydzyk’s 
movement as fundamentalist is the fact that Radio Maryja never officially declared itself against the decision 
of the Second Vatican Council. It also never officially questioned the Pope’s authority to interpret the Bible 
and to guard orthodoxy. Jose Casanova is reluctant to classify Radio Maryja as a fundamentalist movement. 
He stresses that there is a conflict between a more traditional and a more liberal option within all religions, 
which does not necessarily lead to the creation of fundamentalist movements. He would not even agree to 
define Opus Dei as a fundamentalist movement – for him it is connected with integrism, while Lefebvre, the 
founder of the Society of St. Pius X, is, in fact, a heretic (Casanova 2008: 75). Gend wiłl and Stasik 
additionally stress that in certain aspects Radio Maryja is actually very much in accordance with the Second 
Vatican Council, mainly in terms of the role assigned to the laity. 
Another way of looking at Radio Maryja is simply through the perspective of certain processes happening 
within the Church. It is important to remember that in Poland some of these processes remained hidden during 
the time of communism. However, the process of differentiation within the Roman Catholic Church in Poland 
was in fact quietly taking place.  
“During the communist period the internal conflicts within the Church, especially those concerning the 
interpretation of the reforms of the Second Vatican Council were muted. The Church had to be strong 
against alien influences from outside so authorities did not want to create divisions for the government to 
exploit”(Hornsby-Smith, 1997: 136).  
As Casanova stresses, the Vatican II proclamation on freedom of religion was received in Poland as a 
prop in the church’s struggle against the atheist regime. “On the other hand, being embattled as ever, Polish 
Catholicism could not afford sudden changes” (Casanova 1994: 103). Therefore, it maintained the rigidity and 
conservatism which had helped to preserve Polish identity during the partitions. Cardinal Wyszy!ki, known for 
his conservatism, was also a defender of “social Catholicism” and the “church of the masses” rooted in 
traditionalist paternalism that would keep ordinary people in the fold (103). Next to the “church of the masses” 
there were also Catholic intellectual circles around Tygodnik Powszechny or Wi ! - more eager to accept the 
changes. The division between those two approaches to Catholicism became visible only after 1989. Hence, 
the creation of Radio Maryja should not be seen as a sudden outburst of fundamentalism. It was created during 
a time when the Catholic Church in Poland was searching for its place in a new democratic and pluralistic 
society. Such transitional periods usually reveal divisions. Radio Maryja simply gathered the Catholics whose 
religiosity was “traditionalist, narrow-minded and very strongly connected to the idea of national identity”. 
Those people felt threaten by modernity and the outside world. It was easy to predict that in new circumstances 
the two different forms of identity would develop in two different directions (Grabowska 2008: 11). It was also 
easy to predict that they would develop different attitudes toward the model of the Church’s political 
involvement.  
Mirosława Grabowska has offered one more perspective through which Radia Maryja can be analyzed. 
She has suggested that Radio Maryja can be compared with the American Religious Right movement - which 
is neither a party, nor a church, nor a single social organization (15). According to her, it is an internally 
diversified movement or movements with the ambition to represent conservative Christians in the public and 
political sphere (15). Being a researcher of the American Religious Right, I agree with her suggestion. 
However, knowing the history of evangelical involvement in public affairs (including the methods of Billy 
Graham who cannot be classified as the Religious Right leader) I would argue to specify the criteria according 
to which a movement can be classified as a Religious Right. Apart from the fact that it is an internally 
diversified movement with the ambition to represent conservative Christians in the public and political sphere, 
the main idea behind it is to create an organization or a network of organizations, whose leaders, in order to 
promote a religious worldview of a certain religious group, become directly involved in politics, ally with 
conservative right-wing political parties, and take an active role in the process of political mobilization of 
conservative voters. What is more, they use secular methods typical of the political game, instead of restraining 
themselves to evangelization in churches only. 
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All these criteria have been met by Radio Maryja. The Radio and the network of organizations around it 
have been trying to mobilize Catholics in support of socially conservative parties, such as The League of 
Polish Families or Law and Justice since the 1990s. They have been using specific secular as well as religious 
methods. The parties supported by the Polish Religious Right movement are always those that declare 
willingness to create Polish law according to Catholic values.  
In order to illustrate how similarly both Religious Right movements have been operating I will present a 
short history of the American Religious Right movement, list its methods, and give examples of its rhetoric.  
 
2. American Religious Right Movement 
The American Religious Right is a well-researched phenomenon which here serves as a model for the Polish 
Religious Right. The creation of the American Religious Right is related to the so-called “political awakening 
of evangelicals.”22 “Of all the shifts and surprises in contemporary political life, perhaps none was so wholly 
unexpected as the political resurgence of evangelical Protestantism in the late 1970s” (Wald and Calhoun-
Brown 2011: 202). Although according to many researchers fascinated with modernization and secularization 
theories, traditional religion was a “spent force” in American politics, by the end of the 1970s, an evangelical 
political awakening lead to the creation of the so-called New Christian Right, which was later labeled as the 
Christian Right or the Religious Right.  
The New Christian Right was created when “secular” conservative activists from the Republican Party 
(including Paul Weyrich) offered assistance to the emerging leaders of the Christian conservative movement 
(209). The basis for the coalition with the Republican Party was an opposition to the “big government,” which 
was supposed to be a threat not only to economic free-market values but also to traditional religious values. 
The New Right Republicans focused mainly on the cooperation with Jerry Falwell, a televangelist and the 
minister of the nation’s largest independent Baptist church in Lynchburg, Virginia. He became the leader of 
the most prominent Religious Right organization in the 1980s, the Moral Majority, established in 1979. 
Among other early Christian Right groups, there were also: the Religious Roundtable, Christian Voice, and 
National Christian Action Coalition.   
Since the 1980s Christian Right groups have been trying to convince politicians, as well as the general 
public, to apply the teachings of conservative Christianity to politics and public policy. All the organizations 
shared a common agenda. They strongly protested against the Supreme Court’s tendency to interpret the First 
Amendment in terms of “the wall of separation between church and state,” and blamed “secular humanists” 
for “destroying the Christian heritage of the USA” (208). They supported voluntary prayer and Bible reading 
in public schools, as well as noninterference by the authorities with Christian schools.23 They advocated the 
responsibility of the government to encourage the “traditional family unit,” and strongly opposed abortion, 
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22The term “evangelicalism” is very broad. Generally, it is an interdenominational revivalist movement within 
Protestantism, which has its roots in German pietism and Wesleyan Methodism. It became popular in America 
through the 18th and 19th-century Great Awakenings. Evangelicals emphasize the experience of an intense personal 
conversion (new-birth) received thanks to faith and God’s grace, literal understanding of the Bible, and missionary 
work. At the beginning of the 20th century, in response to new scientific discoveries including Darwin’s theory, the 
most conservative evangelicals created the American Protestant fundamentalist movement, stressing biblical 
inerrancy and opposition to modernism. They modified the character of evangelicalism by accepting 
dispensationalism and a militant approach, and later ‘separation’ from the secular world matters. Jerry Falwell, the 
founder of the Moral Majority, was a neo-fundamentalist (a fundamentalist who accepted involvement in matters of 
the secular world). Currently, however, the terms “evangelical” and “fundamentalist” are often used 
interchangeably. The differences between Christian Fundamentalists, Evangelicals, Neo-evangelicals, and Neo-
fundamentalists are explained by G. Marsden in several of his books and articles, e.g. [in:] Marsden G. (1991) 
“Fundamentalism and American Evangelicalism”, in Dayton D.W., Johnston R. K. (ed.), The Variety of American 
Evangelicalism, Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press. 
23
 Some of the fundamentalist schools and universities still practiced racial segregation at that time.
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feminism, and homosexuality. They also declared that teaching evolution and sexual education in schools as 
well as promoting “immoral” behavior on TV were some of the worst social evils (210).  
The Religious Right grew as a reaction to the progressive culture of the 1960s and a fear of social 
disintegration. Jerry Falwell and his followers considered the changes of the 1960s (including women’s 
emancipation, sexual education and the changes in interpretation of the First Amendment) as results of the 
destructive influence of “secular humanism.” “Secular humanists,” according to the Religious Right leaders, 
were responsible for a number of political decisions, such as: decisions from 1962-63 banning school prayers, 
the Roe v. Wade decision which liberalized abortion law on grounds of the “right to privacy,” the Equal Rights 
Amendment. Apart from the fact that Religious Right leaders wanted to mobilize conservative evangelicals 
around the “pro-family” agenda, the movement was also strongly anti-communist and identified communism 
with the forces of the Antichrist (Wald 2003: 210). Moreover, the followers of Jerry Falwell strongly favored 
the Protestant concept of individualism which was, according to them, endangered by social activities of the 
government. Social help and high taxes were considered as a socialist-communist threat to individualism. 
Social liberalism was associated with the Democratic Party, therefore evangelical conservatives decided to join 
forces with the Republican Party, which at that time needed a new voter base. The most important issue for the 
Religious Right movement in the 1980s was to mobilize conservative Christians to register and vote for 
Ronald Reagan in the presidential elections.24 
Although the Moral Majority was the most influential organization within the movement, its existence 
turned out to be quite short. In 1989, due to tensions between  Falwell and Reagan (e.g. over the issue of 
nominating Sandra Day O’Connor to be the Supreme Court Justice), it ceased to exist. But the end of the 
Moral Majority did not mean the end of the Religious Right. Falwell’s organization was soon replaced by the 
Christian Coalition. Its leader, Pat Robertson, was also a televangelist and a former presidential candidate. He 
employed a young operational director, Ralph Reed, who decided to broaden the social base of the Religious 
Right movement. He was convinced that the Religious Right would never be strong enough without an alliance 
with religious conservatives from such religions as Catholicism and Judaism, which traditionally were strongly 
rejected by Protestant fundamentalists. Therefore, he decided to use the term “Judeo-Christian heritage” 
instead of “Christian heritage.”25 Nevertheless, not all evangelical conservatives accepted this rhetoric. Their 
message was still conveying the idea of restoring “the Evangelical quasi-establishment,” which according to 
Watson (1999) is “the voluntaristic version of the American theocratic ideal” (Watson 1999: 110).  
In the speeches of the Religious Right leaders, the Puritan covenant with God was often mentioned and 
Americans were presented as a chosen nation. In 1990, for example, Robertson said: 
“The power, wealth, and freedom enjoyed by Americans were neither accidental nor a result of intrinsic 
merit. It happened because the men and women who founded this land made a solemn covenant that they 
would be the people of God and that this would be a Christian nation” (as cited in Watson 1999:97). 
In many of his speeches, Pat Robertson reminded his listeners that America should be a “Christian 
example to the world.” But, according to him, America’s Christian heritage had been taken away from her (93) 
by liberals and secular humanists who did not understand that “Jesus Christ is the true Sovereign of the US” 
(98). If it had not happened, God would still bless America. As Pat Roberson explained in Christian American 
editorial, the forces of liberalism were based on ideas contrary to the truly American values. That is why in his 
book The Turning Tide he encouraged the “true Americans” to fight against these forces: 
“But let us not stop short until there is a complete restoration of the time-honored traditions of this nation, the 
complete fall of liberalism, and God’s blessings are once again upon the land” (95). 
He reassured his followers that: 
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 Later they supported Republicans in Congressional and presidential elections. Their votes were very important in 
2000 and 2004 when G.W. Bush Jr. was elected president.  
25
 It is also thanks to Ralph Reed that the term “Religious Right” started to be used instead of the term “Christian 
right.”
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“We [the Religious Right] are in [politics] until we see America brought back to its founding principles. Back 
to Bible, back to the Constitution, back to the greatness that it knew trough faith in God, through individual 
self-reliance, through moral restraint” (95).  
In 2001, Jerry Falwell enumerated all the liberal forces which had been destroying America. During one 
of the broadcasts of The 700 Club, he suggested that they were actually responsible for the September 11, 2001 
attacks.  He said:  
“I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are 
actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the ACLU, People for the American Way, all of them who 
have tried to secularize America. I point the finger in their face and say ‘you helped this happen.’”26 
According to Robertson, there is one more force that endangers America. It is a worldwide Jewish 
conspiracy. He propagated this theory in his book, The New World Order (1991). And although Ralph Reed 
tried hard to use rhetoric that would not discourage conservative Jews from supporting the Religious Right, 
Robertson never gave up anti-Semitic views and comments. 
It is important to notice that sometimes the anti-Semitic remarks made by American Religious Right 
leaders also result from Christian Zionism, common among Protestant fundamentalists. It is a belief that the 
return of the Jews to the Holy Land, and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, is in accordance with 
Biblical Prophecy. However, despite unconditional support for the State of Israel, Christian Zionism does not 
entail sympathy for the Jews as a nation or for Judaism as a religion.27 It is important to understand that for the 
Prophesy to be fulfilled and for the Antichrist to be defeated, a significant number of Jews must convert, 
accepting Jesus as their Messiah. Some of the fundamentalists, e.g. Jerry Falwell, also believe that the 
Antichrist himself might be Jewish.   
In order to effectively propagate all their views, the American Religious Right leaders created a wide 
range of institutions and media. The use of modern media turned out to be one of the most important aspects of 
the Religious Right’s activities. Falwell had previous experience in broadcasting his sermons. He started a 
radio program called “Old-Time Gospel Hour” in 1956. Six months later the program began appearing on a 
local television network; eventually it went into national and even international syndication and claimed more 
than 50 million regular viewers. By the time the Moral Majority was created, TV was Falwell’s main tool for 
sending his message. Pat Robertson has also concentrated on televangelism. Since 1961 he has been the owner 
of the television network called Christian Broadcasting Network. He hosts its longest-running program The 
700 Club. Additionally, Religious Right organizations publish a wide range of periodicals. In the 1990s the 
Christian Coalition itself used to publish three magazines: Religious Rights Watch, Congressional Scorecard, 
and Christian America. Evangelical conservatives also quickly learned how to use the internet and now widely 
publish on internet websites.   
Apart from the media, American Religious Right leaders found it crucial to establish schools and 
universities in which young religiously conservative leaders could learn how to successfully act on the political 
scene. In 1971 Falwell founded Lynchburg Bible College, later Liberty University, which is a fundamentalist 
Christian university. Pat Robertson also founded a school: Regent University, an interdenominational private 
university which was opened in 1978. Additionally, Tim LaHaye established The Institute for Creation 
Research (ICR) in Dallas that specializes in education, research, and media promotion of “creation science” 
and Biblical creationism. 
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 Beliefnet, You Helped This Happen. Partial transcript of comments from the Thursday, September 13, 2001 
edition of the ‘700 Club,’ at: http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/Christianity/2001/09/You-Helped-This-Happen.aspx 
[2008]. 
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 For example, one of the leading Christian Zionists, Hal Lindsey, several times implied that “slaughter of Jews 
who do not accept Christ during the last days will be much more than Holocaust.” More in: De Mar G., When All 
Else Fails, Use the “A” Word – Anti-Semitism!, at: http://www.americanvision,org/articlearchive/05-31-05.asp 
[2008]. Also, Pat Robertson made comments based on his Christian Zionist convictions. He implied, for example, 
that Ariel Sharon’s stroke was divine “retribution” for pulling Israelis out of the Gaza Strip.
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Another, very important, method of propagating the views of the American Religious Right is grassroots 
activism.  Distributing voters’ guides (which are simplified comparisons of presidential or congressional 
candidates) in churches, sending letters and leaflets to church members encouraging them to register for the 
elections are only some examples of grassroots activities. It is also important to mention conferences and 
seminars organized by the Religious Right leaders, e.g. a conference entitled:  “Think like Jesus. Lead like 
Moses. Fight like David. Run like Lincoln” (Watson 1999: 57).  
 
3. Comparison 
This short presentation shows that apart from some differences, the Polish and American Religious Right 
movements share many common characteristics. Their leaders created elaborate movements, have been 
involved in politics directly, and have been trying to mobilize as many conservative Christians as possible, 
using grassroots activities. They also created quite similar institutional structures and networks of 
organizations (in the US cooperating but mostly independent from each other, while in Poland all associated 
with Father Rydzyk and Radio Maryja), they learnt how to take advantage of modern media, including radio, 
TV, magazines, newspapers, and Internet, and decided to found their own schools in order to “properly” 
educate their followers and future leaders of the movements. The most important observation, however, 
concerns the similarities in the rhetoric used by the leaders of both movements. 
 The main element of this rhetoric is the idea that religious and national identities are inseparable and 
almost identical. While analyzing the speeches of American Religious Right leaders we can observe that, for 
them, Protestant Christianity was the core of American identity. When we look at the speeches of Polish 
Religious Right leaders, it becomes obvious that, for them, Catholicism is almost identical with Polishness. 
Another element of the rhetoric (a consequence of the first one) is the way of presenting both movements’ 
opponents. They are shown as “enemies” of both the national and religious identities of their countries, mostly 
because they do not share both movements’ views concerning the public role of religion. In both cases, 
Religious Right leaders identify “the enemies” as those responsible for all the social ills of their countries. 
Additionally, in both cases, groups of “enemies” include similar categories of people: liberals, secularists, 
communists, homosexuals, feminists, and “abortionists.” According to the rhetoric used in both movements, 
these are the people who denied the real Christian/Catholic heritage of their countries and, therefore, started to 
threaten their national and religious identities. Both the Polish and the American Religious Right are also anti-
Semitic. However, while American fundamentalists’ remarks often convey the message of Christian Zionism, 
members of the Polish Religious Right concentrate mostly on “Jewish-Mason conspiracy.” Apart from that, the 
followers of Father Rydzyk also present Jews as “traitors,” “communists,” “liberals,” and “strangers” who 
threaten Polish national identity.   
There are also some important differences between the two movements. Firstly, while the American 
Religious Right regards social liberalism and secularism as an outcome of the social revolution of the 1960s, 
the Polish Religious Right closely relates them to the influence of the EU and the West. Secondly, while 
communism is still considered a threat by both movements, for American religious conservatives it is almost 
identical with socialism. They oppose ideas of social help, welfare, and higher taxes, because socialism in this 
form is, according to them, a threat to the Protestant spirit of individualism and self-reliance. In Poland, on the 
other hand, social welfare is not considered as a threat. According to Radio Maryja, economic liberalism is 
much more dangerous because liberals “who believe in money instead of God” want to deprive poor people of 
all their social benefits. Communism in Poland is seen as a threat for other reasons. Polish communists (or 
rather post-communists) are presented not only as the only atheists in the country, but also as thieves and 
traitors. Radio Maryja additionally connects them with other groups of “Poland’s enemies”: the Masons and 
the Jews. Thirdly, there is one category of “enemies” pointed to by the Polish Religious Right leaders, which 
does not exist in the US – the former anti-communism opposition. Its members, according to Father Rydzyk, 
are also traitors because they took part in the Round Table Talks and betrayed the simple people who never 
gained anything from the transformation.   
 When we look closely at the most important element of both movements’ rhetoric, we can easily observe 
that although in both cases the connection between national and religious identity is very strong, it is more 
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explicitly expressed in the case of Polish Religious Right. The reason for that is a lack of religious diversity. In 
Poland over 90 percent of citizens identify themselves as Catholic. Therefore, Polish Religious Right leaders 
feel safe to openly identify Polishness with Catholicism and openly advocate the idea of using Catholic 
morality standards in Polish law and politics. Unlike the American Religious Right, they never had to search 
for support from other religious groups. In the US, on the other hand, because of religious diversity, the 
rhetoric of the religious right always had to be somehow non-denominational. It does not change the fact that 
for most of the Religious Right leaders it is the evangelical kind of Protestantism that is considered the true 
core of American identity. Political calculations, however, do not allow for claiming it explicitly.28  
 
4. In the Perspective of Secularization, Privatization, Deprivatization of religion and other 
theories 
It is interesting to reflect for a moment on the reasons for creating such movements in these two countries. 
There are several possible ways of answering this question. 
The paradigm of secularization has been the main theoretical and analytical framework through which the 
social sciences have viewed the relationship of religion and modernity. Most of the great social thinkers of the 
nineteenth century believed that religion would gradually fade in importance and lose its significance with the 
advent of industrial society.29 This view was accepted and further developed by Peter Berger in the 1960s, as 
well as by David Martin and Brian Wilson in the 1960s and 1970s. Then it was modified by Thomas Luckman 
who in his Invisible Religion introduced the concept of the privatization of religion. However, due to political 
and religious events at the end of the 20th century, which indicated the resurgence of religion in many parts of 
the world, both theories have been questioned.30 The creation of such movements as the ones discussed above, 
as well as many fundamentalisms around the world, caused sociologists to start searching for new answers. 
One of the solutions was offered by Jose Casanova (1994). According to him, academics usually try to 
present a single theory of secularization, while these theories are actually all made up of three unintegrated 
propositions. The first proposition sees secularization as the differentiation of secular spheres from religious 
institutions and norms. The second presents secularization as the decline of religious beliefs and practices and 
the third one views secularization as the marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere. Casanova argues 
that the fruitless secularization debate can end only when sociologists of religion begin to examine and test the 
validity of each of the three propositions independently of each other (Casanova 1994: 211). According to him: 
“It is simply fallacious to argue, for instance, that the permanence or increase in religious beliefs and 
practices, and the continuous emergence of new religions and the revival of old ones in the United States or 
anywhere else, serves as empirical confirmation that the theory of secularization is a myth. It only confirms 
the need to redefine the theory by distinguishing between the general historical structural trend of secular 
differentiation and the different ways in which different religions in different places respond to and are 
affected by the modern structural trend of differentiation”(212). 
Casanova stresses that, apart from a decline in religious beliefs and marginalization of religion to a 
private sphere, there is another possible answer to the process of differentiation. It is a trend that he terms 
“deprivatization” and views as “the process whereby religion abandons its assigned place in the private sphere 
and enters the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society to take part in the ongoing process of contestation, 
discursive legitimation, and redrawing of the boundaries” (65-66).  He underlines that privatization and 
deprivatization are simply different historical options for religions in the modern world. 
“Some religions will be induced by tradition, principle, and historical circumstances to remain 
basically private religions of individual salvation. Certain cultural traditions, religious doctrinal 
 
28
 Casanova claims that considering the circumstances, the least American Religious Right wants to achieve is the 
reestablishment of the Protestant ethics (Casanova 2005: 274). 
29Including: A. Comte, H. Spencer, E. Durkheim, M. Weber, K. Marx, S. Freud. More in: Norris and Inglehart 2005. 
30
 E.g., Peter Berger recanted his earlier claims while Rodney Stark and Roger Finke suggested it was time to bury 
the secularization thesis (ibid.)
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principles, and historical circumstances, by contrast, will induce other religions to enter, at least 
occasionally, the public sphere” (221).  
Despite the fact that there has never been a serious decline in religious beliefs in the US, both of these 
responses to differentiation were adopted by American religions at different times in history depending on 
different stages of the institutional differentiation of church and state in the USA. Therefore, according to 
Casanova, the creation of the American Religious Right can be viewed as deprivatization of religion, a reaction 
to the process of secularization (understood as institutional differentiation), which was chosen by Evangelicals 
at this particular stage. Evangelicals who used to have a dominant position in American society simply 
opposed the process connected with further differentiation, as well as such responses to this process as 
marginalization and privatization of religion. 
In the case of Poland, Casanova suggests that the Church’s involvement in the Solidarity movement was 
an example of a public religion, a deprivatized religion which was involved not only in the struggle against the 
oppressive communist regime which violated human rights but also in advocating freedom of religion 
understood as the right of the nation to openly practice their Catholic religion. It was not clear what role the 
Roman Catholic Church would choose after the democratic changes. Theoretically, it could have withdrawn 
from the public sphere in the new reality when all democratic rights, including freedom of religion, were 
granted to the citizens. If it chose to stay engaged it would be difficult to talk about deprivatization because the 
process of privatization had not taken place during the communist period. However, there are different 
understandings of the term “privatization.” The processes of privatization of certain beliefs within Catholicism, 
for example, have been present in Poland for a long time (Borowik 1997). Nevertheless, the Church in Poland 
had two options. As it turned out, instead of choosing one of them, it became divided, and the Religious Right 
movement was created. We could probably consider the creation of this kind of movement in Poland as an 
attempt to prevent any further privatization of beliefs but also as an opposition to the church and state 
separation model chosen in the new Republic. On one hand, the Episcopate officially agreed to the Polish 
“friendly separation model,” trying, as Casanova suggested, to accept relatively autonomous differentiation of 
the secular spheres, without necessarily agreeing to the decline or privatization of Catholicism nor to its 
withdrawal from civil society (in the creation of which it took active part). On the other hand, the circles 
around Radio Maryja were not satisfied with such solutions. Their attempts to impose Catholic solutions on 
societal problems opened up religious-secular cleavages (predicted by Casanova) and led to internal conflicts 
and divisions within the Catholic community and the church itself (113). Those attached to the hierarchic, 
centralized, and clericalist nature of the Catholic church in Poland, and to traditional elements of Catholic 
culture, have continued to press in the direction of Catholic hegemony, often using a logic that can be 
paraphrased: “In the name of my religious freedom, I can deny you your religious freedom.” 
 It is important to remember that after the 1989 the globalization processes became more rapid and 
obvious in Poland. In his book Globalization and Religion (1994), Peter Beyer states that “the globalization of 
society, while structurally favoring privatization in religion, also provides fertile ground for renewed public 
influence of religion” (Beyer 1994: 71). Religion for him can be understood as a “mode of communication,” 
and globalization – as “a situation in which the revitalization of religion is a way of asserting a particular 
(group) identity (…)” (4). Beyer, who based his theory on Niklas Luhmann’s systemic conception, claims that 
religions try to maintain their influence in the public sphere in various ways. Some of them choose the liberal 
option and some the conservative one. The conservative option means “a reassertion of the traditional view of 
transcendence, often explicitly as a normative response to a society (“the world”) that is seemingly heading in 
a different and evil direction” (90). Such conservative religious movements often try to gain control over a 
limited territory dominated by the particular culture and then control pluralism within it (92). As examples of 
conservative options, Beyer gives such fundamentalist or neo-fundamentalist movements as the New Christian 
Right in the USA, Sikh extremists in Punjab, the politicized neo-orthodox camp in Israel, and Islamic 
fundamentalists in Middle East. Although there might be some definitional problems with calling Radio 
Maryja a fundamentalist movement as such, it certainly implements the characteristics of the conservative 
option that religions choose in order to maintain their influence in the public sphere in the globalization era.  
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Apart from these two new solutions, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart revive the secularization theory, 
stressing that it needs to be updated but not simply rejected.31 Therefore, they construct the thesis of 
secularization based on existential security. In the view of their updated version of secularization theory, it is 
possible to actually consider the creation of Radio Maryja as an element characteristic for one of the stages of 
secularization process. According to the new theory, secularization takes place in regions/countries where the 
existential risk is lowest. If such risk is high, people become more religious. It is characteristic even for such 
forms of religion as the one offered by Radio Maryja to emerge in places where existential risk is high. And we 
must remember that most of the followers of Radio Maryja are poor and less educated. However, according to 
this theory, when the existential risk disappears, the process of secularization is likely to continue.  
If we talk about reviving of some of the older concepts, it would probably also be interesting to remember 
Rodney Stark’s theory. While criticizing so-called demand-side accounts of secularization initiated by the 
work of Weber and Durkheim, he joins Roger Finke, Lawrence R. Iannaccone, William Sims Bainbridge, and 
R. Stephen Warner focus on the “supply-side.” According to the theory of religious markets, if there is a 
separation of Church and state and the country does not discriminate against any religion, a free market of 
religions is usually created. The work of competing religious institutions actively generates its “supply.” 
Religions compete with each other in order to attract new members and religious participation will grow. 
However, if the “religious economy” is monopolized, the level of religious participation will be low. Critics of 
this approach have argued that some comparative evidence is inconsistent with this theory as, for example, 
some congregations in Europe remained strong despite the monopolistic role of the Church. However, Stark 
and Iannaccone tried to explain the exceptions from the general rule of the theory of religious markets, using 
the Irish case (Stark and Iannaccone 1994: 243). As they claimed, the only exception from the rule would take 
place if a religion was involved in a conflict, e.g. resisting external domination. Then the social conflict would 
be the substitute for the religious competition. Such cases could be found not only in Ireland, but also in 
Poland, Malta, and Quebec. In these countries despite a religious monopoly, church participation was high. 
This explanation is not sufficient for some scholars, e.g. Mark Chaves and Philip S. Gorski, however, it seems 
to be helpful in explaining the situation in contemporary Poland. Another element of the market paradigm says 
that the profit and loss account for joining a religious group with strict rules is the most profitable for the 
people who have a lower social position. This might explain why poorer people join such movements as the 
Polish and American Religious Right. 
Another aspect which is important in the case of both the Polish and American Religious Right 
movements is the fact that they were created during a time of some kind of transition or change. In Poland it 
was a political transition, in the US it was the cultural change and social instability of the 1960s. Very often, a 
lack of stability and a feeling of being lost in a new reality result in an intensive search for something stable, 
some kind of identity. In both countries’ Religious Right movements, connecting the ideas of national and 
religious identity offered people something which seemed very secure. Both of those movements also 
concentrated on the groups within their societies which suffered most from the changes: the less educated 
people, mostly from rural areas (Grabowska 2008: 15).  Leaders of both movements easily identified the ones 
who were supposedly responsible for the deteriorating social or economic situation of these groups. 
Additionally, they convinced them that the same people were also the “enemies” of their faith and identity. In 
fact, their rhetoric was full of populism and never offered any reasonable solutions to any problems. Their 
oversimplified answers never corresponded with complicated reality. Nevertheless, the method of keeping 
people in fear and convincing them that those responsible for their misery are the same ones as those who 
threaten the religion of their forefathers worked out. Both movements still have strongly dedicated and loyal 
social bases.32    
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31
 They claim that the critique of the secularization theory relies too heavily on selected anomalies and focuses too 
heavily on the United States rather than comparing systematic evidence across broad range of rich and poor 
societies. More about it in: Norris and Inglehart 2005. 
32
 In Poland it is around 2-4% of the society, although some statistics give numbers as high as 16%. The differences 
result from different way of asking questions (Grabowska M. 2008: 12-13). 
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